We examine the capital flows-domestic investment relationship for 60 developing countries from 1979 to 1999. In the 1990s, even as liberalization attracted new flows, foreign capital stimulated less domestic investment than in the preceding decade. With greater financial integration, governments accumulated more international reserves and domestic residents diversified by investing abroad. Foreign investors were also motivated by diversification objectives rather than by unmet investment needs. Inflows were channeled increasingly through portfolio flows-or through foreign direct investment with the characteristics of portfolio capital-resulting in weak investment stimulus.
Introduction
In the 1990s, foreign capital flows were stepped up to developing countries as they relaxed their capital account restrictions (Figure 1 ). Since developing countries are thought to be short of capital, the new wave of inflows held the potential for raising investment significantly. But was that potential realized? This apparently simple question has received surprisingly little empirical attention.
An important study by Bosworth and Collins (1999) concluded that, on average, for the period 1978-1995, a dollar of external flows raised domestic investment by more than 50 cents; moreover, the foreign direct investment (FDI) component of external flows had an even stronger influence on host country investment. Here we build on their research by extending the time period of analysis to 1999 and examining how the capital flows-investment relationship has evolved over time. In particular, we consider whether that evolution can be explained by the degree of openness to international capital and by the quality of domestic policies.
We find that even as countries liberalized to attract new flows, the impact of foreign capital on domestic investment declined. This result seems surprising. If shortage of capital is a key defining characteristic of developing economies, why, then, did investment not increase? Our results suggest that either the availability of capital was not the binding developmental problem, as in many countries of East Asia, or the ability to absorb external capital into new investments was limited. Thus, much of the new wave of capital was diverted by governments into international reserves holdings or was offset by capital outflows as domestic investors diversified their portfolios.
Foreign investors were also apparently motivated by diversification objectives rather than by significant unmet demand for investment financing. Portfolio flows, which increasingly became a more significant form of external financing for developing countries, have typically had a weak impact on domestic investment. At the same time, as FDI took on some of the characteristics of portfolio capital, its impact on investment also declined. Thus, in recent years traditional "greenfield" investments have given way to "mergers and acquisitions" as multinationals have focused on acquiring existing assets rather than making new investments.
While additional reserves, capital outflows, and shifts in the composition of longrun flows increasingly marginalized the importance of capital inflows as a source of investment-finance, our results also suggest that stronger policy environments tended to strengthen the capital flows-investment relationship. Clearly, the 1990s was a decade of transition-of growing up. Having opened their doors wider to international flows, developing countries faced the challenge of learning to handle and harness these flows.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief theoretical overview of the foreign capital-domestic investment relationship. In section 3, we describe our empirical methodology and discuss the data. In section 4, we present our results, beginning with "base" regressions characterizing the relationship between the various components of long-term capital flows (FDI, bank lending, and portfolio flows) and domestic investment. We then briefly report the variations over time. Finally, we consider an "augmented" model that examines the extent to which the inter-temporal variation in the capital flows-investment relationship can be attributed to capital account openness and the quality of the policy environment. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Overview and Hypotheses
Governments often place capital controls in order to regulate capital inflows.
These regulations are designed to direct capital into specific investment projects. For example, in many countries FDI is channeled into extractive industries and sovereign loans are intended to alleviate infrastructure bottlenecks. At the same time, capital controls are also designed to keep domestic savings within a country. This is not to say that residents do not find ways to take their savings abroad. However, since capital controls raise transactions costs, the scope for "capital flight" is limited. Thus capital controls may accentuate the relationship between capital inflows and domestic investment, either by funneling foreign-borrowing directly into specific investment projects or by deterring capital outflows. Moreover, in the presence of capital controls, central banks may feel less threatened by the possibility of sudden shifts in market sentiment and choose to maintain fewer reserves, so freeing up capital inflows for investment.
When an economy opens up to private capital flows, the impact on investment depends on the domestic investment environment and on the objectives of investors.
Consider two different situations. First, if the marginal returns to capital are high in relation to the world rate of interest, substantial capital will enter the country and supplement domestic savings, leading to a strong relationship between foreign capital flows and domestic investment; such a relationship will persist during a transitional period while the risk-adjusted returns are relatively high. For instance, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) consider the opening of Greece and Portugal, in the context of their joining the European Monetary Union, and document significant capital inflows that financed increased investment and consumption.
A second case arises when an economy is open to capital inflows but domestic returns are low, or no higher than the world rate of interest. Foreign capital may still enter the country to achieve diversification (Kraay and Ventura 1999) . But in this case, there can be no presumption that foreign capital inflows will boost domestic investment.
Developing economies may fall in this category because the lack of complementary infrastructure lowers returns, as also advanced economies that have been open to capital flows and where risk-adjusted returns have been equalized.
It is important to distinguish across various types of foreign capital. Based on their specialized technical knowledge and market experience, FDI investors have an informational advantage over foreign portfolio investors as well as over other domestic investors. In Mody et. al. (2003) , the informational advantage ("intangible capital") allows FDI investors to "outbid" other investor-types for the most productive opportunities, leading to more domestic investment relative to that undertaken by domestic investors or foreign portfolio investors in the same context. This effect is stronger when domestic productivity is higher, since FDI investors are now able to further leverage their specialized knowledge. However, the net effect of FDI on domestic investment will depend on the consequent decisions of domestic investors. If residual domestic investment opportunities offer low returns, domestic savings may be channeled out of the country in search of higher returns or lower risk.
But foreign investment may also "crowd in" domestic investment where it generates spillovers to the domestic economy. In Borenzstein et. al. (1998) , such spillovers occur because foreign investments lower the costs of adopting new technologies, which in turn enhances the rate of growth. Other mechanisms may also operate, as when foreign investments generate demand for specialized inputs, thus increasing the marginal productivity of investments in those inputs. Spillovers are most likely to occur when knowledge can be rapidly transferred within the economy and domestic entrepreneurs are able to absorb that knowledge. While Borenzstein et. al. (1998) view human capital as the main conduit for achieving spillovers, we consider the possibility that the quality of country policies is the more general stimulus for spillovers.
Methodology and Data
We are interested in the influence of gross long-term capital inflows (measured as a fraction of GDP), it K , on domestic investment, it I (also measured as a fraction of GDP). Our focus is on the within-country relationships and we employ the following specification:
where i refers to each of the 60 countries in our sample (Table A1 lists the countries) and t refers to the time period from 1979 to 1999 (our data begins in 1977 but we lose two years due to the use of lags in our estimation procedures, as discussed below). In the estimations, it K represents either total capital flows or its components-FDI, loans and portfolio flows.
The controls, it x , are as follows: the growth rate of real GDP, the real interest rate, the cyclical variation in the ratio of M2 to GDP, a measure of GDP uncertainty, and the change in terms of trade (see Table A2 for a description of these variables). The growth rate of real GDP captures the important accelerator effect. The cost and availability of capital are proxied, respectively, by the real interest rate and the ratio of broad money to GDP separated from its three-year trend. Our measure of uncertainty is based on one-step ahead forecast errors for an AR(2) process in real GDP growth rates (as in Servén 1998). 2 Finally the lagged value of investment, 1 − it I , is included as an additional control to allow for persistence in the dependent variable.
Two econometric issues arise in estimating such a model. First, causality may run from domestic investment to international capital inflows rather than the other way around. To deal with this concern, we need appropriate instruments to isolate the exogenous component of capital flows. Second, the presence of the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of our regressions may bias the coefficient estimates. To deal with these problems, we employ a number of different estimation strategies.
First, using annual data, we estimate a static investment equation with no lags of the dependent variable. First-differencing removes the influence of unchanging country characteristics. This is a useful benchmark, allowing comparison with the Bosworth and Collins (1999) estimates. While instrumental variable estimation reduces the reverse causality concern, the coefficients could be biased due to the presence of serial correlation in the data.
We experiment with a number of instruments, which proxy for shifts in the supply of capital flowing to developing countries. For instance, US interest rates and the phase of the US business cycle can be viewed as largely exogenous and at the same time important determinants of capital flows (Calvo et. al. 1993) . Our preferred instrument however is a measure of the global pool of capital (of the particular type or in the aggregate) available to developing countries. This variable, suggested by Bosworth and Collins (1999) , provides a more direct measure of the supply of global financial capital and reflects a broader set of external supply-side factors. 1 We also consider an alternative instrument suggested by Tytell and Wei (2003) : the weighted average of capital flows/GDP ratios to other countries in the same region; the weights are inversely related to the great circle distances between the largest two cities in any two countries. 2 This regional variable is strongly correlated with capital flows into a given country, but, as with the measure of global capital flows to developing countries, is likely to be weakly correlated with the error terms. As additional instruments we include lagged values of all the endogenous variables including capital flows.
Second, we estimate a similar model, but using data averaged over three-year windows. Since the persistence in the three-year sample is weaker, issues arising on account of serial correlation are expected to be less important. Again, we remove country fixed-effects by first-differencing the data and correct for possible endogeneity using the instruments described above.
Third, we employ the dynamic panel estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to estimate equation (1) The data source does not seem to impact the key results: the relationships reported in Bosworth and Collins (1999) , based on IFS-data are also evident in the GDF-data.
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In addition to the control variables described above, in our "augmented specification," we include interaction terms between capital flows and a financial openness variable and capital flows and a policy variable. Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) , is a graded measure of a country's financial integration with the rest of the world, consolidating the capital account restrictions dummy with other measures relating to the ability of investors to bypass controls on the capital account. 
The Capital Flows-Investment Relationship
We begin by presenting the static specification of the investment equation, with the data observed annually and the instruments for endogeneity as discussed above. As with all of our regressions, unchanging country-specific heterogeneity is removed by first differencing the data. The results reported in column (1) of Table 2 indicate that, on average, each dollar of long-run flows raised domestic investment by 66 cents in our sample of countries. This result is similar to that obtained by Bosworth and Collins (1999) , who found that an additional dollar of total inflows to developing countries raised investment by 52 cents. 9 By contrast a similar analysis conducted for a sample of industrialized countries showed no relationship between foreign capital flows and domestic investment. This is consistent with the earlier discussion that the domestic investment and financing decisions become increasingly dissociated as economic and financial integration with the rest of the world increases.
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In column (2) we re-estimate our investment equation using three-year averages.
The results are largely unchanged. Long-run capital inflows continue to reveal a statistically significant and sizeable impact on domestic investment. These three-year data have the advantage that they are less persistent than the annual series, which is clear from the test of second order serial correlation. 11 The disadvantage is that feedback from domestic investment to capital inflows is likely to be more pronounced.
In column (3) we consider a dynamic investment equation, which is estimated using annual data. This is a more direct approach of addressing the issue serial correlation without introducing the risk of picking up stronger feedback effects. We estimate this specification using the first-difference one-step GMM-estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) . In column (4), we include the additional controls: GDP growth, the real interest rate, the deviation in M2 from trend, GDP uncertainty, and the change in terms of trade. Each variable except for the shock to terms of trade is treated as endogenous; hence two-period lagged-levels for each of these variables are used as instruments along with global long-run flows to developing countries.
The dynamic specification results suggest that the short-run impact of a dollar of long-term flows is to raise investment by between 32 and 44 cents. The strong persistence in investment implies that the long-run impact on investment is considerably higher, ranging from between 118 (=0. from the two-step estimator, which in this case does not lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are in fact valid.
Next, in Table 3 , we repeat the same analysis as in Table 2 , for FDI, loans, and portfolio capital. The results from the annual and three-year average static models presented in columns (1) and (2) Column (3) reports the results using a dynamic specification. The coefficients are broadly consistent with those reported in columns (1) and (2). FDI continues to show a strong and statistically significant impact on domestic investment. In the short-run an additional dollar of foreign investment appears to raise domestic investment by 51 cents.
The persistence in investment implies that this impact is significantly amplified over the long-run. However, the influence of loans falls sharply in the dynamic specification and that of portfolio flows turns negative, though this result is only borderline statistically significant. The contrast in the results with respect to portfolio flows between static and dynamic specifications suggests that prior years of higher investment are associated with new inflows of portfolio capital. The implication is not that portfolio capital is "suckedin" to finance new investment opportunities; rather new inflows enter only to acquire a stake in a larger stock of existing assets. The goal of such investments, which take place at arm's length, is presumably for the purpose of international diversification.
Prior to the debt crisis of the early 1980s, loans were the largest component of long-run flows to developing countries. Starting in the mid-1980s, FDI became the dominant form of foreign capital but by the 1990s portfolio investors had also become major players in emerging markets. The 1990s were also a period of policy change for many developing countries. Restrictions on financial systems were reduced and product and capital markets were opened up to foreign competition. At the same time, greater emphasis was placed on curbing domestic budgetary and monetary profligacy and on building stronger institutional foundations for growth.
In order to explore the impact of these changes, we re-estimate equation (4) of Table 2 using a 10-year window of data rolled forward through time. The long-run impact of aggregate inflows, calculated by normalizing the coefficient on total flows by the coefficient on lagged investment, is plotted in Figure 2 . It is evident that the long-run relationship between foreign capital flows and domestic investment declined sharply over time.
The changes over time in the coefficient estimates for the components of capital inflows are reported in columns (4) and (5) of Table 3 . The results suggest striking differences in the impact of each type of financial capital across the two periods. In the 1980s, it would appear that both FDI and loans had a large impact on domestic investment. Over this period, developing countries received large quantities of both types of flows. By contrast there is no evidence of a link between portfolio capital and domestic investment. However, since the amount of portfolio capital flowing to developing countries was negligible, it would appear, overall, that external flows played an important role in financing domestic investment.
In the 1990s, the link between portfolio flows and domestic investment strengthened somewhat, while the impact of FDI and loans fell. These results are not altogether surprising. The declining impact of foreign direct investment may reflect a shift in the composition of FDI, away from the traditional "greenfield" variety toward more mergers and acquisitions. Arguably foreign acquisitions could lead to capital formation indirectly since newly acquired firms often go through significant restructuring and also because the original shareholders may reinvest in other sectors. It does not appear, however, that either of these effects was important. It is somewhat less clear why the impact of loans declined so drastically in the 1990s. It could be the consequence of a shift from public-to private-sector borrowing. Prior to the debt crisis, the public sector was responsible for the bulk of new borrowing financed by banks. Often these loans were funneled into large scale investment projects. In the aftermath of the crisis, loans fell in importance. Lending which continued went largely to the private sector, which possibly used foreign loans as a substitute for more expensive domestic borrowing.
Thus, our results suggest that in the 1990s, as many countries experienced increased capital inflows, the marginal impact of inflows on domestic investment declined. This is consistent with the observation reported in Table 1 that capital inflows were also accompanied by increases in reserves and outflows following greater financial openness. However at the same time, improvements in the policy environment created new opportunities for domestic investment and reduced uncertainties regarding the macroeconomic environment. This generated additional incentives for developing country capital to stay at home, which may have offset, in part, the effects of increased financial openness.
In Table 4 , we explicitly consider the importance of financial integration and domestic policies by allowing the coefficient on capital flows to be a function of these variables. Columns (1) and (4) of Table 4 report the importance of such interactions when foreign capital takes the form of FDI. Column (1) presents the results from a dynamic specification using annual data, while the regression in column (4) utilizes a static specification with the three-year averages. The results suggest that greater financial integration weakens the impact of FDI on investment. This is consistent with our earlier finding, which showed that the link between FDI and domestic investment declined in the 1990s. It is also consistent with other evidence that FDI has a strong (essentially one-toone relationship) with investment in Sub-Saharan Africa, where most countries still have relatively closed capital accounts, but a weaker impact in Latin America and East Asia, where countries are generally more integrated (see Agosin and Mayer 2000) . The interactions between portfolio flows and openness are similar, although the results are not statistically significant (columns (3) and (6)). The positive interaction between loans and financial integration in the dynamic specification (column (2) 
Conclusions
A potentially important benefit of foreign capital inflows into developing economies is the augmentation of investment resources to add to capital stock with high marginal returns. However, as the paper's theoretical discussion shows, financial integration allows agents to optimize their investment portfolios, and this may not involve increasing domestic investment. The results of this paper suggest that the surge in capital flows during the 1990s was driven largely by this diversification motive.
Countries with better policies did have greater success in absorbing foreign inflows. At least in part, this could be because improved policies raised the marginal product of new investments, while at the same time they created an environment conducive for the diffusion of new technologies and ideas intrinsic to foreign capital.
Improved policies probably also reduced the risk of holding domestic assets, which in turn, by discouraging capital outflows, would have further enhanced the relationship between capital flows and investment. Notes. For each column p-values are reported in brackets. Regressions 1 and 2 were estimated using an instrumentals variables estimator. Columns 3-4 were estimated using the Arellano-Bond (1991) one-step first-difference GMM estimator, using DPD98 for Gauss. The coefficients and p-values are robust to heteroscedasticity. . Notes. For each column p-values are reported in brackets. Columns 1 and 2 were estimated using an instrumental variables estimator. Columns 3-5 were estimated using a one-step first-difference GMM estimator attributable to Arellano and Bond (1991) , using DPD98 for Gauss. The coefficients and p-values are robust to heteroscedasticity. Notes. For each column p-values are reported in brackets. High policy regimes are those with a CPIArating in excess of 3.5 (upper 20 th percentile). Regressions 1-3 were estimated using the Arellano-Bond one-step first-difference GMM estimator, using DPD98 for Gauss. The coefficients and p-values are robust to heteroscedasticity. Regressions 4-6 were estimated using an instrumental variable estimator. 1980-89 1990-1988-1986-95 1984-93 1982-91 * The estimated relationships between long-run flows and investment are based on annual data over 10-year windows that are rolled forward through time. The specification is identical to that used in Table 2 column 4. The long-run impact of flows is calculated by normalizing the coefficient on long-run flows by the coefficient on lagged investment. Estimation is based on the Arellano-Bond one-step GMM estimator.
Endotes
1 One disadvantage of this variable is that it implicitly assumes that while shocks to the supply of capital are positively correlated across countries, shocks to the demand for capital are largely uncorrelated. This is a reasonable assumption, except perhaps during crisis-periods, when demand shocks are more likely to be correlated across borders. In particular a global crisis may trigger sharp declines in investment in a large sample of countries resulting in a decline in flows to developing countries as a whole.
2 The distances were obtained from Boisso and Ferrantino (1997) . Gaps in the data were filled using the authors' calculations. 3 The standard least-squares estimator is biased in dynamic panels and more generally when the explanatory variables are predetermined. Anderson and Hsiao (1982) suggest using lagged observations of the regressors as instruments. Specifically, the dependent variable lagged twice is a valid instrument for the first difference of the lagged dependent variable, while a lagged value of the regressors can serve as an instrument for the first difference of the regressors, when they are predetermined. Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a more efficient estimator which instruments for endogenous and predetermined variables using an increasing sequence of lagged values, thus making use of more information in the sample.
